I understand that the title of this blog post is confusing and borderline annoying, so I will come straight to the point: There is new research evidence that women’s career opportunities can be made more equal to men’s if their male bosses think they should be. Not if their female bosses do. I think this is surprising and worrying enough that I should explain what is going on.
This concern is based on research evidence from a paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Seth Carnahan and Brad Greenwood, and it is based on law firm careers. You might think that lawyers have specialized careers, and you would be right. They are specialized in ways that are useful for testing the theory, however, because the top-class law firms in the sample recruit very similar people, so there is little of the variation among employees that could be used to explain any differences between men and women. Also, heavy-handed discrimination is not possible here because lawyers know how to, you know, file lawsuits. As you can imagine, finding any discrimination at all between men and women in this context would be surprising and interesting. It gets especially interesting because we can use politics to find out what managers want, assuming that liberal lawyers have liberal views including gender equality and that conservative lawyers don’t. Donations to the Democratic and Republican parties are good measures of ideology.
So we know whether the managers (partners) are liberal or conservative, and we know the gender of the employees (associates), and that’s all we need. Carnahan and Greenwood went ahead and analyzed the data, finding that conservative offices hired fewer female associates. Liberals practiced equality in hiring, and the difference reached levels that can be measured even for these elite lawyers. Same story for assignments to task forces and for promotions: women are better off working for liberals.
But then the surprise comes: distinguishing between male and female managers, they found that the helping of women could be shown for only liberal male partners, not liberal female partners. So women’s equality in law firms seems to be for men only to decide. How is that possible? It seems unlikely that women partners care less, especially if they are also liberal. But how much change people make depends on how much they try and how much power they have. That’s where the men have the edge. There are more of them and they are in more senior positions, so ultimately what counts is how men view women’s careers.
Earlier I wrote one blog post on the book Lean In criticizing its depiction of women’s career opportunities and another blog post on research correcting this depiction. Lean In is too optimistic about women’s opportunities to make changes for themselves. This research presents one more problem for the Lean In idea because it suggests that what women think of themselves or of other women is less consequential because they have less power. Real-life careers are not about leaning in, but pulling up.
Airlines want to be safe, friendly, and profitable. Maybe not in that order, but all three are important. Luxury brands in cars, clothes, bags, and watches all want to be exclusive and high-selling. Both at once, of course. These combinations involve conflict among different goals, which means that at some level there has to be a compromise. Saying that compromise is needed is not enough to understand it. How and when will United Airlines make a compromise between friendly and profitable without, for example, compromising the friendly part? And how does Rolex make a compromise between exclusivity and high sales?
The answers to these questions involve both a final outcome and a process of reaching a compromise. Now we know more about the process, thanks to a paper in Administrative Science Quarterly by Carlo Salvato and Claus Rerup. They look at product development in Alessi, the Italian company making all those household items that either you or someone you know has purchased. They make products with great designs that are inexpensive relative to the price of many comparable products, and at least in principle it is pretty easy for other makers to produce legal (or illegal) variations of them.
How does Alessi combine the goals of artistic design and effective manufacturing? We can see the results – egg holders, for example, that are wonderfully playful and well designed but obviously inexpensively produced. The process is harder to see, and that is exactly why some firms like Alessi can put these goals (and products) together very well, but most competitors cannot. The process involves three steps, which function to blend goals and routines in a way that creates a balance between them. First, splicing means connecting routines associated with different goals – like bringing a visionary designer in contact with how things are made. Second, activating means using routines that make people take each goal into account and consider how they can be balanced. Third, repressing means using routines that simplify tasks that benefit some goals while drawing people away from other goals.
Splicing, activating, and repressing are actions that can be taken any time, one by one or in combination. That is not the way to create consistency in how an organization puts things together, however, because if they are done through improvisation the results will differ every time. That is exactly why routines are involved in splicing, activating, and repressing, because routines mean that the same or similar results can be expected every time. Managers can help design and redesign the routines so that employees handle goal conflicts well.
The results are easy to appreciate. Alessi is consistent in how they do things, which means that every new product is an artistic surprise, but we know it will be economically made too. United Airlines is inconsistent, so flights don’t always avoid dragging passengers off, nor do they always involve passenger dragging (fortunately). We all understand that conflicting goals involve compromises. As long as the compromises are consistent, we know what we are getting and can make informed choices. In the long run, the consistency is more important than the goal resolution itself.
Have you ever thought of how easy things are for physics researchers? The laws of physics have stayed pretty much the same through the entire history of the discipline of physics. The only significant change is that researchers have gained better theory for understanding them and better tools for testing the theory. Lucky them.
In contrast, management scholars face constant change in the world of organizations, because what goes into organizations changes – technology, people, and laws – and what organizations try to influence in their environment changes as well – especially markets, but also technology, people, laws, and so on. As a result of all these inside and outside changes, organizations change, and the laws of organization (yes, they exist) change over time, too. We have known this for a while but have not known how. A new paperin Administrative Science Quarterly by Zlatko Bodrožić and Paul Adler looks at how they change.
They focus on technological revolutions, which may be the most decisive influence because other factors (like people and laws) often follow. Just compare the work of coal miners (whom the president sees as important for the future of the U.S.) with computer programmers (the present and future of India). Coal miners work in rigid hierarchies with clearly defined processes because of the safety concerns and communication difficulties they face, and they also face highly mechanized work that requires them mainly to serve their tools. They are an extreme case of the factory, which has its own set of theories that solved many problems 100 years ago but are now barely taught, though their insights survive in mines and factories. Computer programmers are organized in groups with clearly defined tasks but full freedom to design the solution and the process for arriving at the solution, and they face a knowledge-based, communication-heavy workplace in which people create and use intergroup networks to assemble and use knowledge. They work in network organizations, which have their own set of theories that are slightly more recent than the explosive growth of such workplaces.
Every time a technological revolution happens, existing theories begin to fail because they address the wrong kind of organization. The failures are recognized by scholars, who then start building new theories for the new reality. Often spurred by visible problems in organizations, they recognize that the new problems are different. They try to find theoretical solutions to these problems and test them, finding that many are wrong but some are right. As the research accumulates, science proceeds as usual and the best models are agreed on. Then these models are spread, first within the community of scholars and then to the practice of management. Because it takes a while to go through these steps, the period after any technological revolution is one in which few people know enough, though many – both scientists and managers – think they know a lot. The laws of organization have changed, and we need to find the new ones.
So, physics scholars really do have an easier job
than management scholars. That’s pretty obvious. What is less obvious is that when we hear some entrepreneurs leading major web-based businesses complain about the uselessness of business schools, they are half right and half wrong. The right part is that researchers are catching up, so the schools clearly know less about their business than about coal mines, or even software outsourcing firms. The half wrong part is that they don’t know, either – it is possible to be right about a decision without knowing why – and scholars will soon catch up and know this technology and its organizations well.
In La La Land, Sebastian is such a dedicated jazz pianist that he cannot bear playing other kinds of music – and after many trials and travails, he succeeds as an entrepreneur, starting the jazz club of his dreams. A wonderful story of entrepreneurship (the movie had a love story too, I think), but is it realistic? It depends on who you ask.
A recurring theme in entrepreneurship is the trust in generalists – people who can master a wide range of tasks. This trust comes from one big-picture and one small-picture consideration. The big-picture consideration is that successful entrepreneurship has a component of inspiration gained from combining ideas that others do not see as connected. You may be carrying the descendant of such a combination: the iPhone was put together by a company making compact MP3 players that had just exited an alliance with Motorola to make cellular phones. The small-picture consideration is that smaller entrepreneurs often end up being in charge of everything, first directly, then through having to find and recruit expertise in each function. Generalists are good at this.
But could Sebastian have become a capable founder of a jazz club if his interests and skills were all over the place? The argument against generalists is that they are superficial and don’t know enough about any specific topic to do well. A paper in the Administrative Science Quarterly by Olenka Kacperczyk and Peter Younkin has waded into this argument with important ideas and some evidence. Fittingly, the evidence is on music industry entrepreneurship: artists forming independent record labels.
The key idea emerging from their research is this: pure generalists have no particular advantage in entrepreneurship; what is needed is one area of specialization combined with general knowledge elsewhere. Specifically, specialization in the market pays off when combined with general knowledge on the tasks needed for production. This combination buys both credibility and the understanding of customers, which are more important to specialize in than the mechanics of making a product. The investigation showed big effects of market specialization, and effects that were complementary to functional breadth. Market specialists could double their odds of success by becoming more general in functional knowledge; market generalists had low odds to begin with and did not improve much when gaining more general functional knowledge.
So, Sebastian got lucky. Yes, he had market knowledge, but he knew little about different functions (I am not counting tap dancing as a useful function). A more typical case would be Justin Timberlake, whose specialization in R&B and popular music was combined with band membership, songwriting, performing as a backup singer, and music production. So, today’s practical advice: if you want to form a music label, follow Justin’s lead.
Kacperczyk, Aleksandra (Olenka) and Younkin, Peter Y. 2017. The Paradox of Breadth: The Tension between Experience and Legitimacy in the Transition to Entrepreneurship. Administrative Science Quarterly, forthcoming.